American University Law Review
Volume 51 | Issue 5

Article 6

2002

United States v. Drayton: Supreme Court Upholds
Standards for Police Conduct During Bus Searches
Andera K. Mitchell

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons,
and the Transportation Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mitchell, Andrea K. “United States v. Drayton: Supreme Court Upholds Standards for Police Conduct During Bus Searches.”
American University Law Review 51, no.5 ( June 2002): 1065-1079.

This Notes & Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

United States v. Drayton: Supreme Court Upholds Standards for Police
Conduct During Bus Searches
Keywords

Fourth Amendment, Jurisprudence, Supreme Court, United States v. Drayton, Drug Trafficking

This notes & casenotes is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol51/iss5/6

MITCHELL.PRINTER.DOC

7/26/2002 12:56 PM

UNITED STATES v. DRAYTON:
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS STANDARDS
FOR POLICE CONDUCT DURING
BUS SEARCHES
*

ANDREA K. MITCHELL

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.......................................................................................1066
I. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: Consent Searches.........1068
A. Supreme Court Establishes “Free to Leave” Test............1068
B. Florida v. Bostick: Supreme Court Upholds
Constitutionality of Bus Sweeps .......................................1069
C. A Circuit Split Arises from Florida v. Bostick.....................1070
II. Procedural History of United States v. Drayton.........................1071
III. Supreme Court Balances Fourth Amendment Rights with
Law Enforcement Initiatives to Control Drug Trafficking....1072
A. Legal Debate Over the Adoption of a Per Se Rule .........1073
B. Drayton Court Upholds Stare Decisis ...............................1074
C. Broader Impact of Drayton for Passengers of Public
Transportation..................................................................1076
D. Future Implications: Legal and Practical ........................1077
Conclusion .........................................................................................1078


*

Note and Comment Editor, American University Law Review; J.D., 2002, summa
cum laude, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A., 1993, University of
Wisconsin-Madison. Special thanks to Professor David Aaronson for sharing his
knowledge of criminal procedure; Eric Edwards for instilling in me the passion to
study law; and my parents, Betty and Bill Mitchell, for their endless love and support.

1065

MITCHELL.PRINTER.DOC

1066

7/26/2002 12:56 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 1065

INTRODUCTION
To keep pace with the growing problem of drug trafficking, law
enforcement agencies have relied on rapid developments in
1
technology to create and employ new search tactics. Yet one of the
most effective techniques in locating contraband—the consent
2
3
search —demands neither equipment nor innovative technology.
Nonetheless, largely due to the potential for coercion in consent
4
searches, this type of police-citizen encounter triggers hotly
contested legal debates over the Fourth Amendment’s parameters,
5
protections, and restrictions. The Supreme Court’s grant of
6
certiorari in United States v. Drayton, provided a recent forum to
identify more precisely the standards for conducting consensual
7
searches on modes of public transportation.
In Drayton, the Eleventh Circuit reversed two drug possession
convictions of two defendants who were searched while traveling on
an interstate bus, based on its finding that police officers had coerced
the defendants into consenting to a search of their belongings and
8
their persons. On June 17, 2002, the Supreme Court reversed the


1. See generally California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (permitting
aerial surveillance of a suspect’s backyard); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983) (permitting drug sniffing canines at airports); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (allowing use of a “beeper,” which acted as a tracking device, to
ascertain a vehicle’s location). But see Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2043
(2001) (disallowing use of a thermal imaging device outside a person’s home without
a warrant).
2. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (explaining that a
consent search only satisfies the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when an
individual gives such consent freely and voluntarily).
3. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 241 (2d
ed. rev. 1997) (“[T]here are few areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of
greater and practical significance than consent searches.”). All searches and seizures
are presumed unreasonable unless the government first obtains a warrant; however,
this principle does not render all warrantless searches unlawful. STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 34 (6th ed. rev. 2000);
see also WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 13 (1995)
(listing consent as an exception to the warrant requirement).
4. See Petition for Certiorari at 20 n.2 & 22, United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d
787 (11th Cir. 2000) (No. 01-631) (noting the significant and recurring nature of the
coercion issue in consent search cases and referring to numerous published and
unpublished opinions addressing this dispute).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”).
6. 231 F.3d 787 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d, No. 01-631, 2002 WL 1305729, at *1
(U.S. June 17, 2002).
7. United States v. Drayton, No. 01-631, 2002 WL 1305729, at *3 (U.S. June 17,
2002).
8. Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788. See generally Respondent’s Brief at 24-40, United
States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787 (11th Cir. 2000) (No. 01-631) (citing the following
factors as justification for invalidating consent: failure to advise passengers of right
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U.S. Court of Appeals’ decision and concluded that the police
officers had neither seized the defendants nor coerced their consent
9
to a search of their persons or belongings.
In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
10
11
bus searches in Florida v. Bostick, and established a totality of the
circumstances test for determining whether a person had given valid
12
consent to a search.
Prior to Bostick, the Supreme Court also
explicitly rejected per se rules requiring police officers to advise
13
citizens of the right to refuse to consent to searches. Despite this
well-established bar on per se rules, circuit courts have recently split
over whether certain circumstances can make a bus search so
inherently coercive that law enforcement officers must advise citizens
14
of their right to refuse consent.
This Note explains the debate over consensual searches that gave
rise to the Supreme Court granting certiorari in Drayton and


to refuse consent; confined space on bus; number and positioning of officers;
passenger-by-passenger show of authority; authoritative tone of officer’s voice; and
officer’s physical touching of defendants).
9. Drayton, 2002 WL 1305729, at *5.
10. See Dennis J. Callahan, Note, The Long Distance Remand: Florida v. Bostick and
the Re-Awakened Bus Search Battlefront in the War on Drugs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365,
366-67 (2001) (explaining the controversial drug interdiction practice of random
bus sweeps—also known as “working the buses”). When conducting bus searches,
police officers generally board a bus traveling cross-country, announce either to the
entire bus or to individual passengers that they are conducting a random search for
contraband, and then ask individuals for consent to search their persons, belongings,
or both. Id.
11. 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991).
12. See id. at 439 (explaining that the “cramped confines of a bus” are merely one
factor to consider when determining whether consent was voluntary).
13. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (reversing the Ohio Supreme
Court’s ruling that invalidated a consensual search where the police officer failed to
inform the driver in a routine traffic stop that the encounter had terminated and he
was free to refuse consent); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)
(“While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into
account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an
effective consent.”); see also Caralyn Miller Ross, J.D., Anotation, When is Consent
Voluntarily Given so as to Justify Search Conducted on Basis of That Consent—Supreme Court
Cases, 148 A.L.R. FED. 271 § 6 (1998) (citing to Supreme Court cases where the Court
refused to impose per se rules that require law enforcement officers to inform
citizens of the right to refuse consent). But see Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313,
317 (1921) (concluding that consent is not valid where a person merely acquiesces to
a show of authority).
14. Compare United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1395 (11th Cir. 1998)
(reversing a drug conviction pursuant to a bus sweep, where the police officers failed
to inform the defendant that he could refuse consent or leave the bus with his
belongings), with United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1275-76 (10th Cir.
2000) (affirming defendant’s conviction despite the fact that the federal agent failed
to inform the defendant that he could refuse consent to search his carry-on luggage),
and United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding no
coerced consent where officers displayed no weapons, spoke in a casual tone, and
never blocked the aisle or otherwise restrained the passengers).
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addresses the legal ramifications of the decision. Part II of this Note
examines Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to consensual
searches. Part III provides Drayton’s procedural history. Lastly, Part
IV explains the Supreme Court’s decision in this bus search case and
its likely impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
I.

FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: CONSENT SEARCHES

Courts have often referred to the Fourth Amendment as the most
15
ambiguous amendment in the Bill of Rights. Because the Framers
of the Constitution drafted the Fourth Amendment in broad terms,
courts have struggled over the proper scope and application of the
amendment, namely attempting to discern what constitutes a search
16
and a seizure.
A. Supreme Court Establishes “Free to Leave” Test
17

In United States v. Mendenhall, the Supreme Court established a test
to determine when a police-citizen encounter amounts to an unlawful
seizure. Justice Stewart’s “free to leave” test stated: “[A] person has
been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if,
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
18
leave.” Since Mendenhall, courts have relied on the “free to leave”
test—especially in drug interdiction cases—to determine when a
19
police-citizen encounter amounts to an illegal seizure.


15. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 67 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment contains ‘both
the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity.’”) (quoting JACOB W. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 42 (1966)).
16. See DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND PRIVACY 12 (1994) (stating
that while the Fourth Amendment appears simple at first glance, the Framers:
(1) failed to define the meaning of “unreasonable search and seizure” and “probable
cause”; (2) never delineated the type of property protected under the amendment;
and (3) failed to explain whether a warrant is automatically required for all valid
searches).
17. 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (concluding that Mendenhall voluntarily consented to a
strip search, where federal agents acted in a non-threatening manner and advised
the passenger more than once of her right to refuse consent).
18. See id. at 554 (listing several factors to consider in evaluating valid consent:
“the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled”).
19. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (refusing to find that a
state trooper illegally seized the defendant pursuant to a consensual search when the
trooper failed to advise the defendant that he was free to leave after a traffic stop);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1983) (conducting the “free to leave test”
when invalidating defendant’s consensual search of his luggage); United States v.
Brady, 842 F.2d 1313, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (questioning “whether a reasonable
person would conclude from the circumstances, and the show of authority, that he
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B. Florida v. Bostick:
Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality of Bus Sweeps
When the Supreme Court considered Florida v. Bostick, a bus search
case questioning the validity of consensual searches in confined areas,
the Court applied a modified version of Mendenhall’s “free to leave”
20
test. In Bostick, the defendant was convicted of a drug offense after
21
police found contraband in his bag during a routine bus sweep. On
appeal, the Florida Supreme Court, applying the Mendenhall test,
found that a reasonable passenger in Bostick’s position would have
22
believed that he was not free to leave.
In addition, the court
effectively adopted a rule rendering bus searches per se
23
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the drug interdiction in Bostick must
be evaluated in view of a totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a seizure occurred, and it rejected the Florida Supreme
24
Court’s holding that bus searches are per se unconstitutional. The
Court reasoned that these same encounters would not be seizures if
they occurred in a bus depot or on the sidewalk; therefore,
consensual searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment merely
25
because they transpire inside a bus. Based on this reasoning, the
majority established a modified “free to leave” test for circumstances

was not free to leave the officer’s presence” in order to determine if a detention
violated the Fourth Amendment).
20. See infra note 26 and accompanying text (describing the “free to leave” test).
21. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431. Two armed officers boarded a bus traveling from
Miami to Atlanta during a stopover in Fort Lauderdale and asked Terrance Bostick
for his ticket and identification. Id. The officers then explained their purpose of
searching for contraband and asked Bostick for permission to search his luggage. Id.
at 431-32. The trial court agreed with the government’s assertion that Bostick
consented to the search of the luggage and that the officers informed him of his
right to refuse consent. Id. at 432. Pursuant to the search, the officers found
contraband in Bostick’s bag and arrested him. Id.
22. See id. at 432-33 (noting that the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress but certified the narrow question
concerning validity of consent to the Florida Supreme Court).
23. See id. at 433 (quoting Bostick v. State, 554 So.2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1989))
(stating that the Florida Supreme Court “ruled categorically that ‘an impermissible
seizure result[s] when police mount a drug search on buses during scheduled stops
and question boarded passengers without articulable reasons for doing so, thereby
obtaining consent to search the passengers’ luggage’”).
24. Id. at 437-40.
25. See id. at 434-36 (asserting that even though Bostick did not feel free to leave
the bus, the police did not necessarily seize him because he was a passenger on a bus
about to depart and would not have felt free to leave the bus absent police
presence). But see id. at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Unlike a person approached
by the police on the street, or at a bus or airport terminal after reaching his
destination, a passenger approached by the police at an intermediate point in a long
bus journey cannot simply leave the scene and repair to a safe haven to avoid
unwanted probing by law-enforcement officials.”).
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when an individual’s movement is restricted by location: “[T]he
appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to
26
decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”
In applying this reasonable person test, a court must consider all the
27
circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter. Following
Bostick, the circuit courts developed conflicting theories on proper
application of this test.
C. A Circuit Split Arises from Florida v. Bostick
In 1998, the Eleventh Circuit reversed drug convictions in two bus
28
29
search cases, United States v. Guapi and United States v. Washington,
based on the panels’ findings that the defendants in each case did
30
not voluntarily consent to the searches.
The Tenth Circuit,
however, expressly rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in another
31
bus search case, United States v. Broomfield. The conflict stemmed
from disagreement over proper application of the totality of the
circumstances test, particularly whether a court may place additional
emphasis on an officer’s failure to advise passengers of the right to
32
refuse consent. In the Drayton opinion, the Eleventh Circuit


26. Id. at 436. But see id. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the real
issue in Bostick was whether a passenger in the respondent’s position would have felt
free to terminate the police encounter without being affirmatively apprised of the
right to refuse consent). Justice Marshall asserted that the intimidating and coercive
circumstances created during bus sweeps mandate that officers advise passengers of
the right to refuse consent. Id. at 447-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 439-40. The Court underscored two particular factors in examining the
circumstances surrounding the encounter at issue: (1) the officer advised the
defendant of his right to refuse consent to the search; and (2) the officer never
brandished his weapon. Id. at 432.
28. 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998).
29. 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998).
30. In Guapi, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a defendant’s drug conviction
pursuant to a bus search in Mobile, Alabama. 144 F.3d at 1393. Although the court
placed additional emphasis on the fact that the officers failed to inform Guapi of the
right to refuse consent, the panel also evaluated other circumstances of the
encounter. Id. at 1394-95. The court concluded that a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to ignore the officer’s request or leave the bus. Id.
at 1395. Later that year, the Eleventh Circuit decided Washington, where the court
reversed another conviction pursuant to a bus search. 151 F.3d at 1355. Although
the court once again refrained from creating a per se rule mandating consent
warnings, the court did conclude that the coercive atmosphere of this particular
encounter demanded an affirmative warning from police that the defendant need not
consent to the search. Id. at 1357.
31. See 201 F.3d 1270, 1274-75 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that the Eleventh Circuit
incorrectly applied the totality of the circumstances test in Guapi and Washington). In
Broomfield, a DEA agent boarded a bus in Topeka, Kansas during a stopover and
approached the defendant. Id. at 1272.
32. In Broomfield, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s undue
emphasis on one factor, namely, the consent warning, and concluded that under a
totality of the circumstances, the agent’s search was reasonable even though the
agent never informed Broomfield of the right to refuse consent. Id. at 1275-76.
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dismissed the criticism of its sister circuit, reasoning that Washington,
33
and not the Tenth Circuit’s Broomfield decision, controlled its ruling,
34
thereby causing a split in the circuits.
The Drayton decision
presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve this
circuit conflict.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF UNITED STATES v. DRAYTON
On February 4, 1999, three Tallahassee, Florida police officers
35
boarded a bus traveling from Fort Lauderdale to Detroit.
After
boarding the bus, two officers moved to the rear of the vehicle while
36
one kneeled, facing the passengers, in the driver’s seat. At the same
time, two other officers began walking down the aisle asking
passengers where their trips originated and matching the passengers
37
to carry-on bags. When the officers reached Christopher Drayton
38
and Clifton Brown, Jr., one officer leaned over Drayton’s shoulder,
displayed his badge, and informed the men that they were
39
conducting a bus interdiction to deter drug and firearm trafficking.
When asked whether the officers could search his bag, Brown
40
consented.
Noticing that both passengers were wearing baggy pants and heavy
41
jackets despite the warm weather, the officers continued the
encounter by asking permission from Brown to conduct a search of
42
his person, to which Brown consented. During the pat-down, the
officer detected two objects, later identified as cocaine, in the groin
43
area of Brown’s pants.
After an officer handcuffed Brown and
removed him from the bus, the remaining officer asked Drayton for


33. See United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787, 788 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d, No.
01-631, 2002 WL 1305729, at *1 (U.S. June 17, 2002) (“We do not have any occasion
to pass on [the Tenth Circuit’s] criticism, and express no view concerning it, because
we are bound by the prior panel decision in Washington in any event.”).
34. See Circuit Split Roundup, 68 U.S.L.W. (BNA), at 2654 (May 2, 2000)
(reporting that the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Broomfield created a conflict with the
Eleventh Circuit).
35. Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788.
36. Id. at 789.
37. See id. (explaining that the officers would either stand to the rear of the
passenger or to the side during each encounter).
38. See id. (observing that the officer stood with his face about 12 to 18 inches
from Drayton’s face when initiating the encounter).
39. Id.
40. See id. (noting that the officers found no contraband in Brown’s bag).
41. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments On Searches Of Bus Riders, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at A19 (noting that Justice Scalia commented during oral
arguments on Drayton that the respondents’ attire under these circumstances
established probable cause for police to search them).
42. Drayton, 231 F.3d at 789.
43. See id. at 790 (indicating that Brown had 483 grams of cocaine duct-taped to
his thighs).
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consent to search his person, and Drayton consented. In the course
of the pat-down, the officer also found cocaine in the groin area of
45
Drayton’s pants and arrested him. After conviction, the defendants
46
appealed the trial court’s refusal to grant their motions to suppress.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
whether Drayton and Brown’s “consent” to the search of their
persons constituted actual consent or mere submission to a show of
authority. Reversing the defendants’ convictions, the panel found
47
that the decisions in Guapi and Washington controlled, and noted
that the facts in Drayton were materially indistinguishable from those
48
in Washington. Though the court examined four factual differences
49
between Drayton and Washington, it concluded that the distinctions
had no bearing on its finding that the defendants’ consent was the
50
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
product of coercion.
determine whether officers must advise citizens of the right to refuse
51
consent in Bostick-type situations and to resolve the circuit split.
III. SUPREME COURT BALANCES FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WITH
LAW ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES TO CONTROL DRUG TRAFFICKING
52

In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court struck down the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Drayton, finding that the Court of
Appeals effectively created a per se rule requiring officers to
affirmatively advise passengers of the right to refuse consent during
53
bus searches.
The Court concluded that the Tallahassee police
officers seized neither Drayton nor Brown during the routine bus


44. See id. (explaining that Drayton consented to the pat-down by raising his
hands about eight inches away from his waist).
45. See id. (stating that Drayton possessed 293 grams of cocaine).
46. United States v. Drayton, No. 01-631, 2002 WL 1305729, at *4 (U.S. June 17,
2002) (explaining that the trial court denied Drayton and Brown’s motions to
suppress because the officers’ appearance, demeanor and conduct failed to
demonstrate coercion).
47. Drayton, 231 F.3d at 790.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 790-91 (delineating the four factual differences as: (1) an individual
versus general show of authority; (2) the request or failure to request tickets and
identification; (3) hearing testimony in Drayton, but not other cases, regarding
instances when passengers exited the bus rather than consenting to a search; and
(4) the stationing of an officer at the bus exit in Drayton unlike the officers’
positioning in the other cases).
50. Id. at 791.
51. United States v. Drayton, No. 01-631, 2002 WL 1305729, at *3 (U.S. June 17,
2002).
52. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas and Breyer. Id. Justice Souter
wrote the dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. at *9.
53. Id. at *6.
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54

interdiction. Moreover, the Court asserted that the defendants had
55
voluntarily consented to the search of their persons and belongings.
Given that the Court simply applied existing law to a new factual
situation, Drayton offers minimal precedential value and merely
solidifies this Court’s position on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The practical effect of Drayton, however, could be a future alteration
in police tactics in light of the Court’s decision to afford officers
broad latitude in conducting consensual searches.
A. Legal Debate Over the Adoption of a Per Se Rule
The fundamental disagreement between the parties in Drayton
stemmed from whether the Eleventh Circuit, in overturning the
convictions, imposed a per se rule requiring police officers to advise
passengers of the right to refuse consent during bus sweeps. To
illustrate this point, the government asserted a broad view of the
question on appeal to emphasize its position that the Eleventh Circuit
effectively adopted a per se rule, whereas the respondents asserted a
drastically different perspective with a very narrow scope to persuade
56
the Court of the case’s highly fact-specific nature.
The government argued that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding, while
on its face not imposing a per se rule mandating a warning before a
57
consent search, had the effect of creating a per se rule. Drayton and
Brown faced none of the factors typically considered to create a
58
coercive atmosphere, yet the Court of Appeals still found


54. See id. at *7 (finding the police conduct reflected “no application of force, no
intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons,
no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of
voice”).
55. Id. at *8.
56. Compare Petition for Certiorari at I, Drayton (No. 01-631) (stating the issue as:
“Whether an officer who informs a passenger on a bus that the officer is conducting
drug and illegal weapons interdiction and asks the passenger for consent to search,
while another plainclothes officer stays at the front of the bus without blocking the
exit, has effected a ‘seizure’ of that passenger within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).”), with Respondent’s Brief
at I, Drayton (No. 01-631):
Whether three police officers, who boarded a bus solely to obtain consent to
search passengers and their bags, and who sought consent through one
officer’s ‘in your face’ show of authority, a second officer assisting his search,
and a third officer kneeling in the driver’s seat watching passengers, but who
never advised passengers of their rights to ignore officers, and to refuse to
have their carry-on bags searched and their ‘groin areas’ frisked, violated the
passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights?
57. Petitioner’s Brief at 27-28, United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787 (11th Cir.
2000) (No. 01-631).
58. See Petitioner’s Brief at 19, Drayton (No. 01-631) (noting the absence of police
uniforms, showing of force, brandishing of weapons, blocking of exits or issuance of
threats or commands).
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59

respondents’ consent invalid. Therefore, the government asserted
that “[i]f warnings are required in the innocuous circumstances of
this case, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which they would not
60
be necessary.” If the Eleventh Circuit decision was upheld, argued
the government, police officers will have no choice but to issue a
61
Miranda-like warning in every police-citizen encounter.
Conversely, Drayton and Brown asserted that the Court of Appeals
62
did not establish a per se rule mandating consent warnings, but
rather the court concluded, under a totality of the circumstances,
that the respondents did not voluntarily consent to the searches or
63
pat-downs. While respondents acknowledged that the circuit court
took into consideration that the officers failed to give notice of the
right to refuse consent, they denied that the court created a per se
64
rule or placed undue emphasis on that factor alone.
The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the government and
determined that the Eleventh Circuit adopted, in effect, a per se rule
that required the police to issue Miranda-like consent warnings to
65
passengers during all bus searches. While the Court acknowledged
that the Eleventh Circuit relied on numerous factors that could have
contributed to a coercive atmosphere in Drayton, Guapi, and
Washington, the Court also observed that “the lack of an explicit
warning to passengers is the only element common to all [the circuit
66
court’s] cases.”
B. Drayton Court Upholds Stare Decisis
Having concluded that the Eleventh Circuit erroneously adopted a
per se rule, the Court next examined two issues pertinent to
suspicionless bus searches: (1) was there a seizure; and (2) was the


59. See id. (noting that the Eleventh Circuit contradicted well-established law in
Bostick by failing to properly apply the totality of the circumstances test).
60. Id. at 30-31.
61. See id. at 31 (“Short of telling the passengers of the right to refuse consent . . .
it is difficult to conceive of any actions these officers could have taken to make this
search any more reasonable.”) (quoting United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354,
1358 (11th Cir. 1998) (Black, J., dissenting)). But see Respondent’s Brief at 19,
Drayton (No. 01-631) (denying the claim that police will have no choice but to issue
consent warnings and reasserting that courts evaluate each encounter individually).
62. See Respondent’s Brief at 16, 19, Drayton (No. 01-631) (rejecting the
argument that the Eleventh Circuit adopted a per se rule in Drayton either expressly
or tacitly).
63. Id. at 20-21.
64. See id. at 24 (defending the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis by citing to Bostick,
where the Supreme Court found “particularly worth noting” that the officers issued a
consent warning to the passenger).
65. United States v. Drayton, No. 01-631, 2002 WL 1305729, at *6 (U.S. June 17,
2002).
66. Id.
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search unreasonable? In its analysis of these issues, the Court relied
exclusively on well-established search and seizure law without
67
modifying those principles. Because of the fact-specific nature of
search and seizure cases, the Court devoted much of its discussion to
the details surrounding the encounter.
In its brief, arguing that a seizure never occurred, the government
asserted that the circumstances of this police-citizen encounter never
68
rose to the level of a coercive atmosphere: the officers wore no
uniforms, showed no weapons, made no general announcement over
the public address system, spoke in a calm tone, and left an open
69
path to the exit. The respondents, conversely arguing that a seizure
did occur, depicted a drastically different scenario by pointing to the
70
officer’s “in your face” interaction that culminated into a highly
71
invasive search of the passengers’ groins and mid-sections. In fact,
Drayton and Brown pointed to ten separate factors that the Eleventh
Circuit considered in applying its fact-specific analysis to determine
72
whether the men voluntarily consented to the searches.
Examining first the issue of whether the officers seized Drayton
and Brown, the Court relied on the legal framework established in
73
Bostick eleven years ago. The Court concluded that the officers’
conduct during the bus interdiction in Drayton did not amount to a
74
seizure of the defendants. In determining whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to decline the officers’ requests or
terminate the encounter under a totality of the circumstances, the
Court relied on the same facts asserted by the government in its brief:
that the officers never brandished a weapon or made any
intimidating movements; the officers left the aisle free; and the
officers spoke to the passengers individually and in a polite and quiet
75
voice. Furthermore, the Court placed minimal weight on several


67. Id. at *7-9.
68. See Petitioner’s Brief at 19, Drayton (No. 01-631) (quoting the district court’s
finding that the police-citizen encounter in Drayton was neither coercive nor
confrontational).
69. See Petition for Certiorari at 8, Drayton (No. 01-631) (insisting that the
Eleventh Circuit relied on the wrong facts in finding that the police coerced consent
by Drayton and Brown).
70. See Respondent’s Brief at 1, Drayton (No. 01-631) (maintaining that “[a]
reasonable passenger could not ignore the ‘in your face’ show of authority which
officers employed in this case”).
71. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 10, United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d
787 (11th Cir. 2000) (No. 01-631).
72. Respondent’s Brief at 20-21, Drayton (No. 01-631).
73. United States v. Drayton, No. 01-631, 2002 WL 1305729, at *6-7 (U.S. June 17,
2002).
74. Id. at *7.
75. Id.
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factors that Drayton and Brown emphasized in their brief.
Specifically, the Court was not swayed by the fact that the officers
displayed badges and wore sidearms; that one officer kneeled on the
driver’s seat near the bus exit; or that the testifying officer had
observed only a few passengers over the course of a year actually
76
refuse consent during bus searches.
After determining that the officers did not seize Drayton and
Brown, the Court turned to the issue of whether the officers coerced
the men into consenting to a search of their persons and belongings.
Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the searches, including the fact that the officers never
advised Drayton and Brown of their right to refuse consent, the Court
77
nonetheless determined that the defendants voluntarily consented.
The Court reiterated the well-established principle that knowledge of
the right to refuse consent constitutes only one factor in determining
78
whether valid consent to search exists.
C. Broader Impact of Drayton for Passengers of Public Transportation
One glaringly absent component of the majority opinion was any
reference to the need for enhanced security measures following the
79
In its petition for certiorari, the
September 11, 2001, attacks.
80
government pointed to the recent national security concerns, and
amicus briefs pointed specifically to concerns about the safety of the
81
interstate public transportation system. Consequently, much of the
media attention given to Drayton focused on how the Court would, in
the wake of the terrorist attacks, balance the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures with the need for public safety on


76. Id.
77. See id. at *8 (noting that the officer gave Brown and Drayton the opportunity
to object to the search of their carry-on bag and their persons, yet neither individual
displayed any signs of protest).
78. Id. (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)); see also supra note 13 (reciting the holdings
in Schneckloth and Robinette).
79. See Charles Lane, Police Search Of Bus Upheld, WASH. POST, June 18, 2002, at A6
(reporting that the Court made no direct reference in its decision to the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001).
80. See Petition for Certiorari at 22, Drayton (No. 01-631) (asserting that
consensual searches may become increasingly important “in the current
environment” to detect not only drugs but other forms of criminal activity).
81. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation et al. at 5-8,
United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787 (11th Cir. 2000) (No. 01-631) (conveying the
importance of consensual police-citizen questioning in combating the threat of
terrorism after the attacks of September 11, 2001). “Open to relatively easy
penetration, trains, buses, and light rail systems offer an array of vulnerable targets to
terrorists who seek publicity, political disruption, or high body counts.” Id. at 7.
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82

interstate transportation.
Although the majority refrained from explicit references to the
events of September 11, it briefly addressed the broader issue of
national security. In its discussion of consensual searches, the
majority reasoned that bus passengers cooperate with law
enforcement officers “because the passengers know that their
participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those
83
around them.” Vehemently objecting, the dissenters argued that
while the public has accepted the necessary intrusions required for
safe air travel, no such justification exists for similar security measures
84
on ground travel. In fact, this distinction by the dissent between air
travel and ground travel may have signaled an emerging trend in
search and seizure law, where the legal analysis employed could
85
depend on the mode of public transportation at issue.
D. Future Implications: Legal and Practical
Although Drayton possessed great potential to impact Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, especially in regards to police procedure
for obtaining consent to search, the fact-specific opinion provides
86
only minimal precedential value.
In essence, the Drayton Court
complied with past decisions on two long-standing issues of
87
contention in the area of search and seizure law. First, the Court


82. See Lane, supra note 79, at A6 (reporting that Drayton “attracted attention as
an early test of how the court would balance the competing interests of individual
freedom and public safety in the transportation context after Sept[ember] 11,” 2002)
(quoting Donald J. Hall, Vanderbilt University law professor, as stating: “You would
certainly think in a post-9-11 context, the justices are going to be more conscious of
and sensitive to the needs of law enforcement to have as much investigative power as
is constitutionally proper.”).
83. Drayton, 2002 WL 1305729, at *7.
84. See id. at *9 (Souter, J., dissenting) (contending that the “commonplace
precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been justified for ground
transportation”). But see Warren Richey, Court upholds police tactics in searching bus
riders, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 18, 2002, at 9 (“[T]he ruling may prove even
more useful for counterterrorism agents . . . at a time when top government
officials . . . are warning that the U.S. may soon be subjected to the same kind of
suicide bombings on buses and in other public areas as experienced in Israel.”).
85. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Justices Strengthen Police Search Power, CHI. TRIB.,
June 18, 2002, at A19 (quoting Steven Shapiro, national legal director of the
American Civil Liberties Union, as stating that Justice Souter’s distinction between
air and ground travel “could be as important as the court’s decision”).
86. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Rules Police Need Not Tell Bus Riders of
Right to Refuse Search, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A19 (reporting that the Drayton
opinion offers “relatively little new law”). See generally Heidi M. Westby, Fourth
Amendment Seizure: The Proper Standard for Appellate Review, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
829, 860 (1992) (explaining that a court’s fact-specific analysis in an unlawful seizure
case should not have any precedential value because of its highly contextual nature).
87. See Greenhouse, supra note 86, at A19 (observing that the Court
demonstrated its continuing support for the constitutionality of bus searches as well
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demonstrated that the Bostick test continues to govern bus search
88
Second, the Court reaffirmed the bar on per se rules
cases.
requiring police officers to advise citizens of their right to refuse
89
consent to search.
Concerns over the Drayton opinion, however, arise from the likely
practical effects, rather than the legal effects, of the ruling. Indeed,
some members of the criminal defense community contend that the
decision invites law enforcement agents to engage in more aggressive
90
search tactics in arenas beyond public transportation. Defendants’
advocates fear a long-term effect of Drayton could be that lower courts
will afford the government even broader latitude when conducting
consensual searches—sacrificing Fourth Amendment rights in the
91
name of counterterrorism.
CONCLUSION
Drayton presented the Supreme Court with the continuing dilemma
of balancing Americans’ Fourth Amendment freedom from unlawful
searches and seizures with law enforcement’s responsibility to combat
92
drug trafficking.
The Court sent a clear message to the legal
community that both the Bostick test and the bar on per se rules
requiring consent warnings remain very much intact. Above all,
Drayton places the burden of knowing one’s right to refuse consent
93
squarely on individual citizens—not law enforcement. While the
Drayton decision may not drastically alter Fourth Amendment


as clarified where the individual justices stand on this Fourth Amendment issue).
88. Drayton, 2002 WL 1305729, at *6-7.
89. Id. at *8.
90. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices OK Searches on Mass Transit, USA TODAY, June
18, 2002, at 3A (“Advocates of defendants’ rights say the ruling greatly expands
police powers and could lead officers to be more aggressive with people who appear
to have done nothing wrong.”); Frank J. Murray, Warning for search on bus not required,
WASH. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A11 (quoting Donna Shea, legal director of the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, as stating that law
enforcement’s response to the ruling will be more aggressive questioning and further
invasions of bus passengers’ privacy).
91. See Greenburg, supra note 85, at A19 (quoting Boston University Law School
professor, Tracey Maclin, who rejected the notion that Drayton pertained to
combating terrorism and instead asserted that the case represented a “typical,
random working of the buses”).
92. See Ian Heath Gershengorn, When Is a Warrantless and Suspicionless Search of a
Bus Passenger “Consensual”?, 7 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 377, 381 (2002) (referring
to the Court’s “classic struggle” of preserving citizens’ civil liberties while affording
the government latitude in keeping modes of public transportation free from drugs
and firearms).
93. Oral Argument Transcript at 44, United States v. Drayton, 2002 WL 1305729
(U.S. Apr. 16, 2002) (No. 01-631) (“It seems to me a strong world is when officers
respect people’s rights and . . . people know what their rights are . . . and assert their
rights.”).
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jurisprudence, only time will tell whether the ruling generated any
long-lasting and significant effects on the government’s search and
seizure tactics.

